Touro Law Review
Volume 12
Number 3 New York State constitutional
Decisions: 1995 Compilation

Article 8

1996

Double Jeopardy

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
(1996) "Double Jeopardy," Touro Law Review: Vol. 12: No. 3, Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/8

This New York State Constitutional Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

et al.: Double Jeopardy

786

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 12

stated that "the Supreme Court has ... held that a plea
agreement can by its terms expressly waive, for purposes of a
subsequent prosecution, a claim of double jeopardy if the
agreement is violated.' 3 1 Thus, the court ruled that the defendant
waived his double jeopardy claim by entering a plea of guilty
32
after mistrial.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
33
People v. Niccolich
(decided October 2, 1995)

The defendant claimed that his conviction for attempted arson
in the second degree constituted a double jeopardy violation of
both the New York State34 and Federal 35 Constitutions. The
Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the defendant
had been deprived of his right to have his trial completed in a
particular tribunal and determined that reprosecution of the
defendant was barred by double jeopardy. 36 The court reversed
37
the conviction and dismissed the indictment.
On Wednesday, October 13, 1993, the jury was charged and
commenced deliberations. 3 8 The next day, one of the jurors
notified the court that he was ill and had been vomiting the entire
morning. 39 After obtaining the consent of both the prosecutor and
31. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d at 604, 658 N.E.2d at 1015, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
32. Id.
33. 631 N.Y.S.2d 922 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).

34. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article I, Section 6 of the New York
Constitution provides in part: "No person shall be subject to be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense. . . ." Id.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.. . ." Id.
36. Niccolich, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 924.

37. Id.
38. Id. at 923.
39. Id.
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defense counsel, the court instructed the other jurors to go home
and return the following morning. 40
On Friday, October 15, 1993, the court clerk stated that the ill
juror had called and indicated that he would not be able to appear
for that day. 4 1 Despite the defense counsel's request to grant a
continuance until after the weekend, "the Trial Judge declared a
mistrial... concluding that it would be unfair to sequester the
remaining jurors over the weekend without any assurance that
[the ill juror] would be able to return to court on Monday." 42
Subsequently, the defendant pled guilty to attempted arson in the
second degree. 43 The defendant then claimed that his conviction
should have been reversed because the double jeopardy
provisions of both the New York State and Federal Constitutions
prohibit retrial unless there is manifest necessity for the
mistrial. 44
Considering this claim, the court cited to Menna v. New
York. 45 In Menna, the United States Supreme Court stated that

when double jeopardy is triggered, "federal law requires that a
conviction on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was
entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty." 46 Similarly, in
the case at bar, the defendant pled guilty to attempted arson in
the second degree. The court determined that this did not
"foreclose a double jeopardy challenge" available to the
defendant. 47 The court reasoned that the trial court
"improvidently exercised its discretion in declaring a mistrial"
because the trial court had not adequately considered the
alternative of a weekend continuance. 4 8

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

45. 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
46. Id. at 62.
47. Niccolich, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
48. Id.
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50
Citing to People v. Michael,49 In re Enright v. Siedlecki,

United States v. Perez,5 1 and United States v. Jorn,5 2 the court in
Niccolich acknowledged that both the "State and Federal
Constitutions prohibit retrial for the same crime unless 'there is a
manifest necessity for [the mistrial], or the ends of public justice
would otherwise be defeated.' 5 3 The court in Niccolich

determined that there was no manifest necessity justifying the
order of a mistrial because the alternative of a weekend
continuance was a reasonable alternative that should have been
exercised. 5 4 Citing Illinois v. Somerville,5 5 the court concluded
that the defendant's right to have his trial heard in its entirety by

a particular tribunal was violated, and, thus, reprosecution was
prohibited by double jeopardy and, as a result, the indictment
56
was dismissed.

49. 48 N.Y.2d 1, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 420 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1979). In
Michael, the New York State Court of Appeals stated that "[s]ince the Trial
Judge is in the best position to determine whether a mistrial is in fact necessary
in a particular case, that court is entrusted with discretion in this area, and
deference is to be accorded the Trial Judge's decision to declare a mistrial."
Id. at 9, 394 N.E.2d at 1138, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
50. 59 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 451 N.E.2d 176, 179, 464 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421
(1983) (stating that on review the court will hesitate to interfere with the lower
court's discretion, but noted that this discretion is not without limits).
51. 22 U.S. 579 (1824). In Perez, the defendant was on trial for a capital
offense. Id. The case was given to the jury to decide, but the jury was unable
to reach a decision. Id. As a result, the trial court discharged the jury without
obtaining the consent of the defendant. Id. The Court found that these actions
would not preclude a future trial on the same offense and, accordingly, sent the
case down to the trial court to be retried. Id. at 580.
52. 400 U.S. 470 (1971). The Jorn Court stated that "[r]eprosecution after
a mistrial has unnecessarily been declared by the trial court obviously subjects
the defendant to the same personal strain and insecurity regardless of the
motivation underlying the trial judge's action." Id. at 483.
53. People v. Niccolich, 631 N.Y.S.2d 922, 923 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1995) (quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824)).
54. Niccolich, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
55. 410 U.S. 458 (1973). In Somerville, the Court stated that a defendant
has a "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal." Id. at
466 (internal quotes omitted).
56. Niccolich, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
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